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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NEALY W. ADAMS,
Petitioner/Appellant,

Case No. 20040722-SC

v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent/Appellee,

ARGUMENT
I.

THE STATE'S BRIEF IMPROPERLY CITES TO MATTERS
THAT HAVE BEEN STRICKEN FROM THE RECORD

On multiple occasions in its Appellee Brief, the State
makes repeated references to matters that were stricken from
the Record by the habeas court below.

Such references are

prejudicial, inflammatory, and highly improper, and
Appellant Adams ("Adams") respectfully objects to the same.
Specifically, Adams objects to the State's repeated
references to the substantive contents of the affidavit he
submitted in connection with his motion for reconsideration
before the habeas court. Adams also objects to the State's
improper reference to the death certificate of the purported
victim, Carleen Hess.

By order of the habeas court, these

matters were stricken from the Record on August 7, 2004.
(See Addendum A, attached to Appellant's Brief at 6, paras.

3-4.)

As such, it is entirely improper for the State to

make any reference to these matters on appeal.

Yet the

State does so willfully and with impunity, on numerous
occasions in its Brief.

See, e.g. , Appellee Brief at 6, 51-

53 (improperly referring to the substantive contents of the
Adams affidavit), and at 53 n.6 (improperly referring to the
victim's death certificate).
Even worse is the fact that the State has grossly
misportrayed the substantive contents of Adams' affidavit.
To correct this gross inaccuracy, Adams must now be
permitted to make his own references to the contents of the
affidavit; otherwise, his position will suffer great harm
and prejudice on appeal.
One particularly glaring misportrayal of the affidavit
occurs at page 52 of the State's Brief, wherein the State
asserts that Adams was told by attorney Earl Xaix that his
claims for postconviction relief "lacked merit."
Brief at 52.)

(Appellee

In making this assertion, the State has

omitted an extremely critical fact: that attorney Xaix made
this statement without the benefit of having reviewed Adams'
file.

(Record at 284.)

The State has thus taken this quote

out of context. Also, significantly, the State neglects to
2

m e i 11 : i c i i I : .1 .< ; t I I \ < i ii: i, : , \ h 3 s 1 : efi 1:1 ided 1 s. i z e a b l e por t:i 0 1 1 : • i: 1
retainer, which tends to show that a less than thorough
review of his claims had been made. 1

(lea.)

Again, these

are critical facts, necessary to paint a more complete and
accurate depiction of the contents of the affidavit.
After ba :I3 \ r 111 i spoi: tra y :i n g t:l le a f f d d a v :i t :i 1 :i :i t:s brief,
the State then infers that Adams'' lack of success d n
locating counsel somehow "suggests that his claims
simply be inherently weak, 1

Anoel'lee Brief "

*may

^'--h/: )

Again, this inference is inaccurate, ana demands immediate
cl a r i f i- • ;

i n i ; r'

-,p- ..
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1^ •

the diligent efforts h e m a d e to a t t e m p t t o l o c a t e c o u n s e l .
For e x a m p l e , Hit a i i i a a v i t states t h a t a f t e r having h a a no
s u c c e s s w x t h ••^.'rrr' v-

. \ .7

S t a t e Bar for a -,.-1 ol a t t o r n e y s c a p a b l e of handdiri:;
h a b e a s p e t i t :i • : :i

(Re c o 1: d a 1 : 2 8 4 )

I: :i i : • = s p o 1 1 s e, A d am s

r e c e i v e d - I i <=r ^f t h r e e a t t o r n e y s t o c o n t a c t .

H e w r o t e to

all t h r e e >j,.t h e a r d o a c k from o n l y o n e , w h o t o l d h i m that he
( Id )

did not hand 1 e h a b e a s c a s e s

T I: 3 e r e a f t e r r A d a in s \ / 1: : « :> t e

to several other state bar associations, again requesting a
1

As well, the state 1 las unfairly implied ti lat the c l a i m s
that were d i s c u s s e d w i t h a t t o r n e y X a i x a r e t h e same claims
a s s e r t e d in A d a m s ' p e t i t i o n for p o s t c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f .
3

list of attorneys that could help him file a habeas
petition.

As a result of his efforts, Adams received the

name of one attorney, but the letter he sent to that
attorney was returned as undeliverable•

(id. at 284-85-)

Following this, Adams eventually was referred to his current
legal counsel by other inmates at the prison.

The foregoing

in no wise suggests that Adams' claims are "inherently
weak," as incorrectly implied by the State.

Instead, a full

review of Adams' affidavit shows that he made a diligent and
concerted effort to retain counsel, and his lack of success
in doing so was through no fault of his own.
By making repeated references to matters that have been
stricken from the Record, the State now stands before this
Court with unclean hands.2 As a matter of fundamental
fairness, Adams asks this Court to fashion an appropriate
remedy.

Toward that end, Adams asks this Court to: (1) read

his affidavit in its entirety, and fully consider it for

2

There is no justification for the State's repeated
references to these stricken matters. Certainly, Adams was
careful to avoid any reference to them in his Appellant
Brief. While Adams did raise a challenge to the habeas
court's order striking his affidavit from the Record, he was
careful to avoid any reference to the substantive contents
of the affidavit. Further, he made no reference at all to
the victim's death certificate.
4

purposes of this appeal; (2) strike the offending references
in the State's Brief to the victim's death certificate; (3)
admonish the State for improperly referring to stricken
matters; and, (4) enter such further and additional relief
as the Court deems just and appropriate under the
circumstances of this case.

II. PROCEEDINGS UNDER THE PCRA AND PROCEEDINGS
UNDER HABEAS CORPUS ARE INTERCHANGEABLE
A key issue that has emerged in this appeal is whether
proceedings under habeas corpus are interchangeable with
proceedings under the PCRA.

The State's brief argues that

they are not, asserting: "Proceedings under the PCRA are not
habeas corpus proceedings under a different label."
(Appellee Brief at 9.)

In an attempt to support this

argument, the State undertakes a fairly lengthy discussion
of the history of habeas corpus law, drawing a distinction
between the writ of habeas corpus and the writ of coram
nobis. (Icl. at 9-13.)

The State deduces that the PCRA is a

descendant of the writ of coram nobis, not habeas corpus.
(Id.)

Ultimately, the State concludes that the PCRA's legal

remedy is not directly analogous to habeas corpus relief.

5

(Id. at 14.)

On this point, the State's position finds some

support in dictum from a recent decision from the Utah Court
of Appeals, Manning v. State, 2004 UT App 87, 89 P.3d 196
(2004).

However, as more fully set forth below, the Manning

case runs counter to controlling precedent in this
jurisdiction.

Despite the State's protests to the contrary,

this Court has always treated habeas corpus proceedings as
synonymous with proceedings under the PCRA.

A.

The Primary Function of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus Is to Provide Relief from Unlawful
Confinement, which Is the Same Relief
Afforded Under the PCRA

It has been said that habeas corpus is Ma generic term,'7
encompassing several different kinds of writs, the most
important of which is the writ of habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum.

39 Am Jur 2d § 1, at 200,

The fundamental

purpose of the writ is to deliver an individual from
unlawful custody, including unlawful confinement resulting
from the deprivation of a constitutional right04.

Id. at 200-

Historically, the writ has been considered the Marling

of the English law," Rathbun v. Baumel, 191 N.W. 1233 (Iowa
1922), and its scope and function have been deemed so

6

important as to warrant constitutional protection from
legislative encroachment.

U.S. Const. Art. I § 9 cl. 2;

Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (there is no higher
duty than to maintain the writ of habeas corpus unimpaired).
Utah law has long recognized the critical role the writ
has served in protecting individual liberty.

More than 50

years agof this Court declared: "We must never lose sight
... of the fact that habeas corpus is the precious safeguard
of personal liberty."
(Utah 1943).

Thompson v. Harris, 144 P.2d 761, 766

Several years later, in Hurst v. Cook, 777

P.2d 1029 (Utah 1989), this Court undertook a very elegant
and flattering analysis of the function and scope of the
writ.

In Hurst, this Court emphatically declared:

"Quintessentially, the Writ belongs to the judicial branch
of government."

777 P.2d at 1033.

The Court added: "While

the essence of judicial power cannot be encapsulated in one
writ, the writ of habeas corpus is one of the most important
of all judicial tools for the protection of individual
liberty."

Id. at 1033-34. Against this backdrop, it is

easy to see why the writ of habeas corpus has been
designated "the Great Writ."

State v. Perry, 758 P.2d 268,

273 (Mont. 1988); Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1376
7

(Utah Ct. App. 1993) (Orme, J., concurring).
To the extent the writ of habeas corpus may be used to
collaterally attack a criminal conviction, "the purpose of
the writ is now served in many jurisdictions by postconviction relief acts, which are deemed to be substitutes
for habeas corpus."
added).

39 Ana Jur 2d § 1, at 202 (emphasis

By enacting the PCRA, Utah has followed this trend.

However, notwithstanding the enactment of the PCRA, the Utah
Supreme Court has consistently allowed inmates to challenge
their convictions by way of petitions for writ of habeas
corpus, treating such petitions as analogous to, and
interchangeable with, petitions for postconviction relief.
This point was made very clear in Hurst, wherein this Court
stated: "Although a post-conviction relief remedy and the
writ of habeas corpus have sometimes been thought to be
separate procedures, the writ of habeas corpus has, over the
years, absorbed the post-conviction relief remedy to form a
single constitutional remedy."
added).

777 P.2d at 1033 (emphasis

This is quite a definitive statement.3

Only last year, this Court issued an opinion that
strongly reinforces the notion that postconviction relief is
3

See also footnote 1 in Julian, 966 P.2d at 250.
8

synonymous with habeas corpus relief, Gardner v. Galetka,
2004 UT 42, 94 P.3d 263 (2004).

In Gardner, this Court

quoted the following language from Julian v. State, 966 P.2d
249, 253 (Utah 1998): "the legislature may not impose
restrictions which limit the writ as a judicial rule of
procedure, except as provided in the constitution."
However, in place of the term "the writ", this Court instead
interposed the term "post-conviction relief."

Gardner, 2004

UT 42, at 517. Notably, Gardner was a unanimous decision,
adopted by each member of this Court as it is currently
constituted.

Based upon the foregoing, there is no question

that this Court continues to adhere to the notion that postconviction relief is interchangeable with habeas corpus
relief.

B.

Gardner Cannot Be Squared with Manning

One month before this Court issued its decision in
Gardner, the Utah Court of Appeals issued Manning v. State,
2004 UT App 87, 89 P.3d 196 (2004).

Among other things, the

Manning case is significant for attempting to draw a sharp
distinction between relief under Rule 65B of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, which the court says is more properly
9

reserved for habeas corpus proceedings, and relief under
Rule 65C, which applies to PCRA proceedings.

The Manning

court noted the "widespread confusion" that exists amongst
litigants in seeking relief under these provisions.
App 87 at 112,

2004 UT

In a footnote, the court stated that while

post-conviction relief may have had "its roots in the
ancient writ of habeas corpus, it does not follow that the
two may be used interchangeably, especially given the
subsequent enactment of the PCRA."

Id. at 120 n.5.

Immediately prior to making this statement, the Manning
court remarked: "Our decision today is not fundamentally
inconsistent with Utah's pre-PCRA jurisprudence."

Id.

Actually, however, it is.
Manning simply cannot be squared with Hurst, nor can it
be squared with Gardner. Moreover, it cannot be squared
with Julian, nor State v. Frausto, 966 P.2d 849 (Utah 1998),
Bennett v. Holden, 932 P.2d 598 (Utah 1997), nor Swart v.
State, 976 P.2d 100 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).

Each of these

cases involve successful appeals (save Gardner) by inmates
of the dismissal of their petitions for postconviction
relief, whether such petitions are styled as petitions for
extraordinary relief (as in Julian), petitions for writ of
10

habeas corpus {as in Bennett and Frausto), or petitions for
postconviction relief (as in Swart and Gardner).

Further,

each of these cases cite to, and rely heavily upon, habeas
corpus law as the definitive, underlying basis for the
decision reached therein.

There is simply no fundamental

difference between these cases. Manning, however, fails to
reconcile them with its dictum that postconviction relief
and habeas corpus relief are not interchangeable.

Despite

the Manning court's efforts to distinguish between habeas
corpus proceedings and petitions for postconviction relief,
the Utah Supreme Court has consistently treated these two
procedures as synonymous, concluding that the two form "a
single constitutional remedy."

HurstF 111 P.2d at 1033. To

the extent that Manning holds otherwise, it is simply not
good law.

III. THE PCRA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL NOT BY SUPPLANTING
HABEAS CORPUS RELIEF, BUT BY IMPAIRING IT
The PCRA significantly impairs the right of a person to
petition for habeas corpus relief, as typified by the
premature dismissal of Adams' petition on purely procedural
grounds, i.e., the statute of limitations. Although the

11

State claims in its brief that the PCRA embodies a new legal
remedy that simply supplants prior extraordinary remedies
without infringing upon them (Appellee Brief at 17), such
claim is untenable.
Application of the PCRA is extremely broad, encompassing
seemingly all petitions for postconviction relief-

While

the State claims that the PCRA "permits" any person who has
been convicted of a criminal offense to file a petition
under its provisions, the Act seems hardly permissive•
Instead, on its face it appears to be mandatory in scope,
leaving no room for convicted persons to separately petition
for extraordinary relief when mounting a collateral attack
on their convictions.

S^e UCA § 78-35a-102; Utah R. Civ. P.

65C(a) ("This rule shall govern proceedings in all petitions
for post-conviction relief filed under Utah Code Ann. § 7835a-101 et seq., Postconviction Remedies Act.").
If the State is correct in its view that the PCRA is
permissive in nature, then the lower court clearly erred in
dismissing Adams' petition pursuant to the PCRAfs one-year
statute of limitations.

This is because Adams' petition

sought not only postconviction relief under the PCRA, but
also, in the alternative, extraordinary relief by way of
12

habeas corpus.

The petition itself is styled, "Verified

Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (URCP 65B, C); Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus," Record at 1.

Further, in its

prayer for relief, the petition requests not only the
holding of an evidentiary hearing to allow Adams to prove
his claims, but also that the habeas court "issue an Order
for Extraordinary Relief to have the Petitioner [Adams]
brought before it, to the end that the illegal activity of
the Respondents be terminated, and that the restraint upon
Petitioner's liberty be removed."

id. at 20-21.

In pleading for habeas corpus relief, Adams' petition
clearly satisfies the standard for pleading a claim upon
which relief can be granted, sufficient to defeat a motion
to dismiss.

Insofar as his petition has adequately plead

grounds sufficient to warrant the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus—by pleading the occurrence of an obvious
injustice, or the substantial and prejudicial denial of a
constitutional right, Hurstf 777 P.2d at 1034-35--his
petition should not have been dismissed.

The petition on

its face meets the legal standard for relief by pleading the
deprivation of a constitutional right, i.e., the deprivation
of the right to receive effective assistance of counsel,
13

both at trial and on appeal.

See Dunn v. Cook, 7 91 P.2d

873, 878 (Utah 1990) (issue of ineffective assistance of
counsel may be raised in a habeas proceeding).
Consequently, Adams has adequately plead a valid claim for
habeas corpus relief.

Therefore, to the extent the PCRA is

permissive, and allows litigants to continue to pursue
extraordinary relief separate and apart from the Act, it was
error for the lower court to dismiss Adams' petition based
on the statute of limitations.

Julian, 966 P.2d at 254

(holding that XNiio statute of limitations may be
constitutionally applied to bar a habeas petition.").
In the alternative, to the extent that the PCRA is
nonpermissive, but rather binding upon Adams and all other
inmates seeking to collaterally attack their convictions,
then it is constitutionally infirm.

Effectively, the PCRA

has operated to bar what the lower court found to be a
nonfrivolous petition.

Such result would not have occurred

prior to the enactment of the PCRA, only after.

But for the

PCRA's one-year statute of limitation, Adams' petition would
have been allowed to proceed.

Consequently, the PCRA has

clearly impaired Adams' right to seek redress by due process
of law, in violation of the open court's provision of the
14

Utah Constitution (article I, section 11) and the separation
of powers clause (article V, section 1)•

This is the

dilemma that confronts the State in this appeal.

IV, ADAMS HAS ASSERTED A CLAIM OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE,
WHICH CLAIM HAS BEEN PROCEDURALLY BARRED
The State's brief at page 31 argues that the PCRA's
statute of limitations would never bar a claim of "actual
innocence/' The clear implication is that Adams7 petition
involves something other than a claim of actual innocence.
The State is wrong in both respects: first, the one-year
limitation period contained in the PCRA does indeed bar
actual innocence claims; and second, Adams has asserted a
claim of actual innocence.
The following hypothetical is illustrative of the PCRAf s
bar on claims of actual innocence:
Inmate A is convicted of a felony following
trial by jury, based solely on the testimony of
a single eyewitness, witness B, the purported
victim. No other witnesses testify, including
Inmate A, acting on the advice of counsel.
However, Inmate A was actually out of state at
the time of the crime, and is completely
innocent. Prior to trial, he asked his counsel
to investigate his claim of an alibi, but no
investigation was done. Instead, defense
counsel chose to focus his efforts on attacking
the credibility of the eye witness, and on
15

challenging the reliability of eyewitness
testimony in general.
After being convicted, Inmate A discharges his
trial counsel and retains new counsel, who
files an appeal asserting that the evidence was
insufficient to show guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Like trial counsel, appellate counsel
also neglects to investigate Inmate A's alibi
defense. The appeal fails.
After serving five years of a fifteen year
sentence, Inmate A encounters Inmate C while in
prison, and receives a sworn confession from
Inmate C, the actual perpetrator of the crime.
Shortly thereafter, Inmate A receives an
affidavit from his accuser, recanting her
testimony. However, the accuser dies one day
later in an auto accident.
Armed with this new evidence, but not being
legally adept, Inmate A decides to do nothing,
figuring the more time he serves behind bars
the greater his claim for damages will be when
the time comes to sue the State for wrongful
imprisonment. For two years he sleeps on his
rights. He makes no attempt to contact an
attorney. Finally, after deciding he has
served enough time behind bars for a crime he
did not commit, he initiates a petition for
postconviction relief.
In this hypothetical, Inmate A's petition would be timebarred by the PCRA.

It is time-barred because Inmate A,

despite being actually innocent, knew the evidentiary facts
on which his petition was based, but waited too long under
the PCRA to file a petition for relief.

In this respect,

Inmate Afs claims are not saved by the interests of justice
16

exception, because he simply waited too long to file after
being apprised of the factual basis for his claims. But for
the one-year limitation period contained in the PCRA, Inmate
A would have otherwise been able to establish his innocence.
Adams' case is no different.

Like Inmate A, he has not

filed a petition in an effort to "get off on a
technicality," but rather to assert a claim of actual
innocence.

But for the one-year time limit set forth in the

PCRA, his petition would not have been prematurely
dismissed, and he would have been afforded an opportunity to
show his innocence in court.

In other words, he would have

been afforded "a remedy by due course of law."

Horton v.

Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1092 (Utah 1989).
To flesh out this argument, it is important to outline
the basis for Adams' claim of actual innocence.

This claim

is predicated in part on the ineffective assistance of his
trial counsel in failing to assert a defense of voluntary
intoxication.4

More likely than not, had trial counsel met

minimum levels of competency by properly asserting such a
defense, Adams would not have been convicted (especially if
the other known errors that were committed at his trial are
"Record at 11-15, 203-08.
17

remedied,5 and the scant evidence of his guilt is
considered).6

Under these circumstances, it is

unconscionable not to reexamine Adams' conviction, inasmuch
as it is now impossible to entertain any real confidence
that the correct outcome was reached at trial.7 Yet
notwithstanding the foregoing, the lower court has
procedurally barred Adams' claim.

This procedural bar

simply cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny.
Although the State would have this Court believe that
achieving finality of criminal convictions is of paramount
importance, is not the purpose of our criminal justice
system to incarcerate innocent persons.

Where an error has

occurred that results in a conviction, particularly one
impacting the magnitude of a defendant's constitutional
rights (e.g., the right to receive effective assistance of
5

See Appellant Brief at 14-16, para. c.

6

See Appellant Brief at 16 n.3. Judge Davis of the
Utah Court of Appeals has expressed sharp criticism of the
prosecution's evidence, concluding it was "hardly adequate
to support a conviction." State v. Adams, 955 P.2d 781,
(1998) (Davis, J., dissenting).
7

See State v. Thomas, 743 P.2d 816 (Wash. 1987)
(appellate court's confidence in the outcome of defendant's
trial undermined where defense counsel failed to present a
voluntary intoxication defense, deemed to be "crucial" to
the fairness of the trial).
18

counsel, both at trial and on appeal), our system must allow
such individuals to seek redress from their wrongful
confinement.

This is true no matter how much time has

lapsed before redress is sought. As one authority on habeas
corpus law has remarked: "Habeas corpus provides a remedy
without limit of time for jurisdictional and constitutional
errors occurring on the trial of a criminal case."

39 Am

Jur 2d §157 at 348, citing U.S. v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469
(1947), reh'd denied, 332 U.S. 784 (1947); Palmer v. Ashe,
342 U.S. 134 (1951), opinion conformed to, 86 A.2d 61 (Pa.
1952).

Utah law adheres to this principle.

In case after

case, Utah appellate courts have consistently and repeatedly
rejected the State's claim that finality of criminal
convictions must prevail over fresh habeas proceedings.
See, e.g.. Hurst, 777 P.2d at 1034-35 ("As important as
finality is, it does not have a higher value than
constitutional guarantees of liberty."); Dunn v. Cook, 791
P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1990); Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357,
1370-71 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); Julian, 966 P.2d at 254;
Fraustof 966 P.2d at 851; Swart v. State, 976 P.2d 100, 101
(Utah Ct. App. 1999) .
In the case at bar, Adams has plead a nonfrivolous claim
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for habeas corpus relief, but has been deprived the right to
seek redress for the same.

He has thus been deprived of a

remedy by due course of law.

The legislature's efforts to

restrict access to habeas corpus relief by enacting the
PCRAfs one-year statute of limitations, while no doubt
motivated by good intentions, nevertheless trample on the
open court's provision of the Utah Constitution, as well as
the separation of powers clause.

This Court should thus

find the PCRAfs one-year limitation period unconstitutional,
and reinstate Adams' petition forthwith.

V.

ADAMS DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE
OF THE EVIDENTIARY FACTS UNDERLYING HIS PETITION
FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

Aside from the constitutional infirmities noted above,
the PCRA suffers from at least one other major infirmity.
That is, even with the inclusion of the interests of justice
exception to help alleviate the harsh one-year limitation
period, the PCRA still lacks the flexibility in allowing
individuals who may know the evidentiary facts of their
claims to pursue such claims in a timely fashion if they
lack the legal skill and know-how to do so. Again, Adams'
appeal presents a classic example of this problem.
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In this case, Adams has asserted that both his trial
counsel and his appellate counsel were ineffective in
failing to advance a defense of voluntary intoxication.

It

is undisputed that during the material events in this case,
Adams suffered from severe alcoholism.

His problem was so

acute that at times, he would pass out from drinking too
much, after which he would have no memory of what had
transpired.

Record at 3, 11 11-12.

Often, he drank to the

point of being completely unable to comprehend who he was,
where he was, and what he was doing.

Id.

Certainly, these

facts were known to Adams when he went to trial, and when he
filed his appeal*

Yet the legal significance of these facts

(i.e., they negate mens rea) was entirely unknown to him,
not having had any background in law.
This is important.

Utah appellate courts have long

recognized the severe legal constraints confronting inmates,
compounded all the more with the urgency under the PCRA to
navigate quickly through an unknown legal system by filing a
highly technical and procedurally complex petition. As
pointed out above, supra at 10, the Utah Court of Appeals
has recently noted that "widespread confusion" exists with
respect to determining the exact procedure for litigants to
21

follow in seeking postconviction relief.

Manningf 2004 UT

at 512. As difficult and confusing as it is for attorneys
to decipher, it near impossible for inmates to figure outWhen was the last time an inmate succeeded in filing a pro
se petition for postconviction relief?
The instant case presents the perfect opportunity for
this Court to provide much needed guidance to litigants and
courts by clarifying the proper procedure and method to be
followed in granting or denying postconviction relief.
Among the many questions that have been brought to the
surface in this appeal are the following: (1) are habeas
corpus proceedings interchangeable with proceedings under
the PCRA?/ (2) may an inmate seeking postconviction relief
opt out of the PCRA and pursue a separate claim for common
law habeas corpus relief?; (3) is the PCRA's one-year
statute of limitations unconstitutional?; (4) may an inmate
seeking postconviction relief who knows the factual
underpinnings of his claims, but who does not know the legal
significance of those facts, nevertheless still pursue a
petition for relief after the expiration of the one-year
statute of limitations?; (5) what is left of the Great Writ
if it is supplanted by postconviction relief, the two no
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longer forming a single constitutional remedy?

An opinion

from this Court answering the foregoing questions would be
extremely helpful to practitioners in alleviating the
widespread confusion that now exists with the PCRA.
It is respectfully submitted that Adams' failure to
comprehend the legal significance of the facts underlying
his claims for relief should not pose a bar to his petition.
Utah law is replete with opinions noting the disadvantages
that inmates face in seeking legal redress in court,
particularly with respect to seeking habeas corpus relief.
The following quote from the Utah Court of Appeals is
illustrative: "In weighing the interests of the litigants on
either side of a habeas corpus action, we note that [an
inmate] trying to ascertain his or her rights and to file
all reasonably known claims in the initial petition must
make these complex legal decisions with limited knowledge of
the law, limited access to legal assistance and often no
access to a law library."
1370 (1993).

Currier v. Holden, 862 P.2d 1357,

Similar sentiments were echoed by this Court

in a concurring opinion in Julian: "In Utah, most minimal
legal research materials are lacking at the prison, and the
legal services provided to assist the prisoners are grossly
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inaccurate."

966 P.2d at 259 (Zimmerman, J., concurring).

In a recent case, Swart v. State, 976 P.2d 100, 101
(1999), the court of appeals reinstated a tardy petition for
postconviction relief where the defendant alleged he lacked
the legal training to file the petition, and he was unaware
of the PCRA's one-year limitation period-

In the case at

hand, Adamsf petition has asserted similar arguments. As
such, there is no legal basis for treating his petition
differently than the defendant's petition in Swart. The
mere fact that he lacked the legal training and know-how to
properly file a timely, properly supported petition should
not bar him from obtaining a remedy by due course of law.
This Court should therefore reverse the lower court's
improvident dismissal of Adams' petition.

VI. THE FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS STANDARD IS NOT THE
APPLICABLE STANDARD IN UTAH
The State's brief makes numerous references to federal
habeas corpus law.

Such references are inapposite.

The

standard for obtaining federal habeas corpus relief is
intentionally more difficult to achieve than the standard
applicable in most states.

This is not to suggest that
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Adams' petition would not qualify for federal habeas relief.
Instead, it is only intended to correct any false impression
that federal habeas law is relevant to this appeal. The
State's citations to federal habeas law are unhelpful,
because this Court has expressly refused to adopt the
federal standard.

As this Court remarked in Dunn v. Cook,

791 P.2d 873, 878 (Utah 1990):

x>

[T]he state once again seeks

to have this Court adopt the federal cause and prejudice
standard[] to govern waiver on habeas. We expressly decline
to do so.

The circumstances of federal habeas are different

from the circumstances of state habeas.

In our view, it is

appropriate that federal habeas review be more difficult to
obtain than state habeas review."

(Emphasis added.)

Federal habeas law is simply not the applicable standard
in Utah.

Therefore, the State's numerous references to the

federal standard in its brief should be given little or no
weight.

VII.

ADAMS HAS SATISFIED THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE
EXCEPTION

The State's brief devotes surprisingly little attention
to the issue of whether Adams has satisfied the interests of
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justice exception.

The State argues that Adams' pleadings

have failed to satisfy the exception.

It protests in its

brief that "[i]f interpreted too broadly, the interests of
justice exception would defeat the purposes of the
limitations period."

(Appellee Brief at 38.)

The State

therefore argues in favor of a very narrow interpretation of
the exception, applying it "only under truly exceptional
circumstances."

(id. at 36.)

Unfortunately for the State,

the interests of justice exception has always been given
broad application.
This Court's holding in Julian v. State. 966 P.2d 249,
254 (1998), is dispositive.

The following quote is taken

verbatim from the lead opinion in Julian:
The State argues that the habeas court
misinterpreted the purpose and meaning of the
^interests of justice' exception, which should be
read narrowly to apply only under truly exceptional
circumstances. According to the State, the purpose
of statutes of limitations is to encourage
litigants to diligently seek out and file their
claims early so as to promote finality and to
protect defendants from having to defend stale
claims. That policy, the State asserts, is equally
important in post-conviction proceedings, in which
the State has an interest in keeping persons
convicted of serious crimes incarcerated. Thus,
the State maintains that allowing attacks on
legitimate convictions many years later makes it
difficult, if not impossible, for the State to
defend against those claims.
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We fully appreciate the State's concerns. We
emphasize, however, that when a court grants relief
pursuant to a habeas corpus petition, it does so on
the ground that the petitioner has been wrongfully
incarcerated. That is to say, a court should grant
relief if the petitioner establishes that he or she
has been deprived of due process of law or that xit
would be unconscionable not to re-examine the
conviction.' Therefore, if the proper showing is
made, the mere passage of time can never justify
continued imprisonment of one who has been deprived
of fundamental rights, regardless of how difficult
it may be for the State to reprosecute that
individual.
We note that while Julian does not directly
challenge the constitutionality of section 78-35a107 (the one-year statute), he argues that if the
State's narrow construction regarding the
^interests of justice' exception has any merit,
then that statute [like section 78-12-25(3)3 also
unconstitutionally limits habeas corpus actions.
Under our reasoning in this case, proper
consideration of meritorious claims raised in a
habeas corpus petition will always be in the
interests of justice. It necessarily follows that
no statute of limitations may be constitutionally
applied to bar a habeas petition.
Id. (emphasis added).
Although the State in its brief tries to claim that
Julian's "broad interpretation of the interests of justice
exception would swallow the rule and render the one-year
limit meaningless," (Appellee Brief at 38), the State is
nevertheless bound to follow it, just like the habeas court.
Inasmuch as Adams' pleadings before the habeas court
properly satisfied the interests of justice exception, and
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clearly they did, particularly when the Adams affidavit is
considered,8 this Court should reverse the habeas court's
ill-advised dismissal of Adams' petition,

CONCLUSION:
In this appeal, the State has advanced no new arguments
to support the constitutionality of the PCRA.

Instead, it

has reverted to the same redundant arguments that have been
previously rejected in case after case, to wit: that the
principle of finality overrides individual liberty; that
federal habeas law should be followed in Utah; that the
interests of justice exception should be read narrowly; that
the PCRA is not interchangeable with habeas corpus
proceedings; and so on and so forth.

Although the State's

arguments have almost uniformly failed in the past, the
State continues to present them, and even convinced the
lower court to depart from the law and dismiss Adams'
petition under the guise of the statute of limitations,
despite this Court's clear mandate that no statute of

8

The habeas court strongly intimated that if the
subject affidavit were to be considered, Adams would have
satisfied the exception. See transcripts attached to
Appellant Brief at Addendum E, p. 27, LL 6-14.
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limitations may be constitutionally applied to bar a
properly supported petition for postconviction relief.
Perhaps in large part due to the State's continual efforts
to erode this Court's precedent, widespread confusion has
now crept into the law, and it has become very difficult for
practitioners to determine the proper method and procedure
to follow in seeking postconviction relief.

This Court

should now once again enter the fray, and use the instant
appeal as an opportunity to provide much needed guidance to
litigants and courts. Adams requests that this Court now
definitively reaffirm its prior holdings, and once again
uphold the vitality and integrity of the Great Writ in the
face of statutory attack.
In the final analysis, Adams has properly plead a cause
of action for habeas corpus/postconviction relief.

To that

extent, it was error for the lower court to procedurally bar
his petition, preventing it from being heard on its merits.
Adams requests that this Court now reverse the lower court,
and reinstate his petition forthwith.
DATED: / V W 1, WoC.
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